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Aesthetics of Fake 
An Overview 
Andrea Mecacci 
The definition of an «aesthetics of fake», its configuration and problematization, covers 
the history of aesthetics with many ambiguities. The word «fake» and its several 
synonyms (copy, forgery, simulacrum) touch on a number of ontological and mimetic 
issues that since Plato have led directly to contemporary debates. In the present survey 
we will try to outline a «grammar of fake» through three points: a) the issue of pseudos 
in Plato and its impact on contemporaneity; b) the notion of hyperreality as absolute 
fake; c) the dimension of operative fake, grasped in its postmodern enucleation. 
1. A grammar of pseudos 
The problem of fake emerges forcefully in Plato’s aesthetics. The complexity of the 
Platonic discussion of fake is known and depends on the interconnection of different 
aspects that cannot be isolated: the true, the good, and obviously, the mimetic (Halliwell 
[2002]). The issue of fake is not only at the centre of Platonic mimesis, but is also the 
most visible and recognisable translation of that space of untruth involving the human 
being in all manifestations of logos. In the Sophist and the Republic Plato worked out 
subtle classifications to give an account of this illusory space that gives rise to an actual 
«technique of deception» (Soph. 264d6). At least three types of fake emerge. They are 
not always distinguishable from each other, but apparently produce three different 
experiences: the eikon (copy), the eidolon (image), and the phantasma (appearance). 
These experiences take shape in relation to their degree of difference with the truth 
and/or with the original model they reproduce. So the eikon is a perfect copy of an 
object, whereas the phantasma is an illusory appearance that does not respect the real 
proportions of the object. 
Beyond these distinctions, however, Plato maintains the belief that the fake is, at a 
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first stage, the most elementary moment, and is actually the result of an erroneous 
equation, that is the equivalent of phantasia and aisthesis, appearance and sensation 
(Theaet. 153c3). The matching between what appears and the sensation mediating this 
appearance not only creates a false perception, a deception of senses, but it is also the 
first degree of a possible technique of deception. In the Republic Plato indicates this 
perceptual fake as the first moment, obviously fallacious, of the cognitive process («the 
theory of the line»). The eikasia, this perceptual dizziness that produces false 
appearances, not only indicates the ambiguous realm of opaque images (dreams, 
hallucinations, shadows), but also gives a definitive negative meaning to the image with 
respect to knowledge and truth: «Understood thus in its broad sense, the image not 
only comes to be integrated into the domain of doxa in respect of that which makes it 
the opposite of episteme, but it also seems to be introduced into the heart of doxa, 
whose boundaries and whose field of application it reveals at one and the same time» 
(Vernant [1979]: 179). 
The conflict between appearance and reality, triggered by the mimetic process, leads 
not only to the awareness that one can have a distorted reproduction of reality, beyond 
any reproduced likeness, but also to a scenario in which the fake is assumed to be a 
possible reading of reality as a whole – overall, as Plato states in the allegory of the cave, a 
false idea of the world. What remains of Plato’s condemnation of fake is obviously a vision 
(moralistic according to some authors) that considers the pseudos as a project of the 
global falsification of reality, a falsification that has to do not so much with the production 
of objects, as with the production of fluctuant and humoral opinions, subject to the 
constant fascination of the sensible world. This shift shows the fake as a place revealing 
where a deeper question can be put. The fake reveals the distinction between being and 
appearing in all its tangibility, the location of the image within the various degrees of 
reality and its coincidence with the universe of doxa (Vernant [1979]: 181-184). From a 
phenomenology of fake, one proceeds not only to an ontology of truth, but also of its 
contrary as shown by the example of three beds in book X of Republic (597a-598b) the 
ideal form (the eidos of bed, the «bedness») to its material objectivity (the multiplicity of 
beds made by the carpenter) and finally to the imitative reproduction of the second level 
by creating an additional stage that is easily identified with the domain of the fake. Where 
there is falsehood, there is the possibility of an art of deception, the mimesis of fake: «And 
if there’s falsity then there’s deception. And if there’s deception then necessarily the 
world will be full of copies, likenesses, and appearances» (Soph. 260c6-9). 
The Platonic dialectic of the original and the copy has defined, especially in the 
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context of the reflection on artwork, a distinction between what is authentic and what is 
not. The negative fetish of the inauthentic is one of the most enduring legacies of 
Platonic aesthetics. It is a devaluation that was initially aesthetic and then became a 
moral condemnation: the inauthentic as a territory of seduction and guilt as shown, just 
to give two examples, by the modernist attacks on kitsch or the vexed suspicion toward 
cosmetic surgery. Platonic admonitions against the pseudos (ontological, moral, and 
mimetic) pour into what remains one of the most obsessive attempts to work out a 
grammar of counterfeit art: the 1897 essay What is Art? by Tolstoy. The specificity of 
Tolstoy’s text, a sort of ante litteram x-ray analysis of kitsch, is that what is analysed and 
considered as a product of counterfeiting (poddelka) is not a series of minor works, 
immediately recognisable as artistic surrogates if not as consumer products, but the 
great works of nineteenth-century modernity, the first being Wagner's 
Gesamtkunstwerk. Reading these pages, Platonic legacy appears obvious at least on a 
censorious level (Murdoch [1977]: 16-17). It is the modern art as a whole to define it as 
an immense simulacrum of an authentic idea of folk art, of an ethical communication 
system according to the definition of Tolstoy: «We cannot fail to observe that art is one 
of the means of intercourse between man and man» (Tolstoy [1897]: 47). 
The fake (counterfeit in Tolstoy’s lexicon) is just what contradicts this request. Unlike 
in Plato’s work, the counterfeit is not so much a perceptual error or an illusory 
appearance, as a strategy to create only an aesthetic pleasure, an act of enjoyment (and 
indeed Plato might agree on this point). To realise this purpose the poddelka shows 
itself through four characteristics: borrowing, imitating, striking effects, and interesting 
(Tolstoy [1897]: 106). The first two are related to the object, the second two to the 
subject. The borrowing (zaimstvovanie) is the use of clichés, the recycling of familiar 
images and content, whereas the imitating (podrazhatel’nost) is the tendency to fill in 
the work with details, descriptions, in this way trying to make a kind of cast of reality. In 
turn, the striking effects (porazitel’nost) represent the ways in which the subject’s 
senses are solicited in her/his fruition (violence and sex scenes), whereas the interesting 
(zanimatel’nost) is both a mere intellectual dimension, for example analysing the plot 
complexity or the author’s technical competence, and at the same time a distracted 
fruition, a mere entertainment. 
Plato and Tolstoy consider the fake and the relative grammars as a mimetic 
dimension that repudiates an ontological (Plato) and artistic (Tolstoy) authenticity and 
they arrive at an ethical characterisation of the aesthetics of pseudos. In modernity this 
interweaving will be maintained only in the criticism of kitsch, while the issue of fake will 
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mutate into another inquiry: the possibility of identifying criteria to recognise the 
authentic or the identity of artwork, and its definition. 
For Goodman and Danto, the fake (the inauthentic) is the key to exploring a possible 
definition of what a work is compared with an artefact (identical to the artwork), or to 
distinguishing between two perceptually identical works/objects. Although they are 
conducted with obvious and not irrelevant distinctions, Goodman’s and Danto’s theses 
find their start with the theory of indiscernibles, where the indiscernibility is always 
perceptual, retinal. The known examples (a picture and a perfect copy of it, Warhol's 
Brillo Box and that one sold in a supermarket), the «perfect fake» according to 
Goodman’s terminology, lead back the fake to a matter of hypermimetism where what 
will eventually appear as the relevant crux is the same aesthetic signification of 
authenticity. The impossibility of distinguishing between the original and its double is 
overcome not without difficulty by a view that moves the perceptual experience of non-
recognition to a cultural one of recognition. «Although I see no difference now between 
the two pictures in question, I may learn to see a difference between them. I cannot 
determine now by merely looking at them, or in any other way, that I shall be able to 
learn. But the information that they are very different, that the one is the original and 
the other the forgery, argues against any inference to the conclusion that I shall not be 
able to learn» (Goodman [1976]: 103-104). This perspective, based on the exercise and 
development of capacities of discernment (Goodman [1976]: 111-112), a view that is 
not so far from what Hume stated in his Of the Standard of Taste, does not exhaust the 
problem of fake. Goodman detects the dimension of what cannot be faked in the 
distinction between autographic and allographic works. So Goodman may work, not as 
Plato, with respect to levels or degrees of ontological falsification, but may detect the 
relevance or dimension of the signification, the fake itself in the aesthetic experience. 
«Let us speak of a work of art as autographic if and only if the distinction between 
original and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact 
duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine. If a work of art is autographic, we 
may also call that art autographic. Thus painting is autographic, music nonautographic, 
or allographic» (Goodman [1976]: 113). Danto, discussing Goodman’s thesis on the fake 
(Danto [1981]: 41-44), insists on his idea of the overcoming of the aesthetic for the 
definition of an artwork which he applied to the fake too. The fake is not a «perceptual 
concept» and the indiscernibility is somehow his definitive proof or at least makes it 
apparent. The distinction between fake and copy cannot be stated through perceptual 
predicates, but the essence of fake has to be searched for elsewhere: «Its being a 
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forgery, one would think, has something to do with its history, with the way in which it 
arrived in the world. And to call something an art work is at least to deny that sort of 
history to it – objects do not wear their histories on their surfaces» (Danto [1981]: 44). 
The fake of art, the central example Eco develops in the chapter “Fakes and 
Forgeries” in his The Limits of Interpretation (1990), is a pretext to test the criteria for 
acknowledging authenticity. The semiotic method, namely the conception of fake as a 
sign, unfolds in four criteria of which Eco cannot but emphasise their weakness. It is 
worth noting that Eco shifts the analysis of fake from perceptual criteria (what 
represents the starting point in Goodman and Danto) to criteria of historical purport, 
and even to criteria of social convention. The four tests listed by Eco – 1) proofs through 
material support; 2) through linear text manifestation; 3) content; 4) external evidences 
or referents (Eco [1990]: 193-197) – show a weakness which can only be amended by a 
social agreement, a cultural sharing. The theoretical weakness of criteria for authenticity 
gives way to a pragmatic principle: «Even though no single criterion is one-hundred-
percent satisfactory, we usually rely on reasonable conjectures on the grounds of some 
balanced evaluation. Thus we cast in doubt the socially accepted authenticity of an 
object only when some contrary evidence comes to trouble our established beliefs. 
Otherwise, one should test the Mona Lisa every time one goes to Louvre, since without 
such an authenticity test there will be no proof that the Mona Lisa seen today is 
indiscernibly identical with the one seen last week» (Eco [1990]: 201).  
The ontological impasse of fake leads to new scenarios. The contemporary 
aestheticisation seems to modify the experience of fake. In daily practice the 
discernment of authentic, the final outcome of the aesthetic taste, is replaced by artistic 
fetishism. It is a condition that leads directly to what Eco and Baudrillard define as 
hyperreality. So we see the uncontrolled phenomenon of fake aesthetic, where the 
ontological and mimetic problem has now mutated into a dimension, so to speak, for 
tourists. Certainly the Parthenon in Athens is «historically» better than its 1897 replica in 
Nashville, a reproduction of the Parthenon in every detail, showing it to us as it should 
appear in its original appearance (Eco [1990]: 184-185, 201). In this difference we still 
feel the dimension of the fake: tourists who in Florence fetishistically admire outside 
Palazzo Vecchio the copy of Michelangelo's David (without knowing that the original is 
preserved elsewhere) (Eco [1990]: 183), or the Getty Museum in Malibu where «original 
statues and paintings are inserted in very well reproduced “original” environments, and 
many visitors are uninterested in knowing which are the originals and which the copies» 
(Eco [1990]: 185). 
Andrea Mecacci, Aesthetics of Fake 
pag. 64 
© Aisthesis – pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico • 2/2016 • www.fupress.com/aisthesis • ISSN 2035-8466 
2. Hyperreality and absolute fake 
In the account of his journey into the American make-believe in the mid-1970s, Eco 
notices a decisive dialectic: the relationship between the real thing and the absolute 
fake. No longer platonically opposed in an ontological conflict, these poles now define a 
continuous exercise of the desire in a culture increasingly tied to the image. The desire 
for authenticity can only be expressed in the logic of absolute fake. Everything is 
duplicated, particularly the past that undergoes a pervasive iconic cannibalisation: «The 
“completely real” becomes identified with the “completely fake”» (Eco [1977]: 7). This 
involves a shift in the role played by the mimetic. Now Plato’s targets, activated by the 
mimesis (illusion, double, iconic seduction), become a cultural strategy: the fake parts 
from the mimetic process, that process which considers itself still tied in a subordinate 
way to an original model, becomes the sign of itself, creates a new dimension of reality, 
the hyperreality. Even the aesthetic pleasure aroused by the hyperreal has its own inner 
logic. The fake is not so much the reaching of a technical perfection as the theorising for 
which, in front of this absolute iconism, the real will always be inferior and therefore less 
pleasant and desirable: the falsification (absolute) turns into a criterion of aesthetic 
pleasure. And this marks, as we shall see, the shift from the urban paradigm in Las Vegas 
to the one of Disneyland (Eco [1977]: 39-48). 
In parallel with Eco, Baudrillard has analysed these processes of derealisation by 
interpreting contemporaneity as an evident agony of the real and rational that is the 
modern, and as an input into an era of simulation: to the time of production follows the 
time of simulation, as to the logic of sense follows the logic of fascination (or seduction). 
The simulation is the dimension that exceeds or denies the ideology of representation, 
namely the ideology of a still hierarchical relationship between reality and image that 
has as its goal the attestation of the truth. It is around this belief that the whole 
philosophy of Simulacra and simulations focuses; it is the test by which Baudrillard in 
1981 gives definitively his theory of the hyperreal fake: «It is no longer a question of 
imitation, nor duplications, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the signs of 
the real for the real, that is to say of an operation of deterring every real process via its 
operational double» (Baudrillard [1981]: 2).  
Baudrillard has repeatedly insisted on the articulation of fake indicating three phases 
(Baudrillard [1976]: 50). The first phase, the counterfeit, dominates the classic period of 
modernity, from the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution. It is the impulse toward 
artifice, the negation of the natural. The first modernity engages in a gigantic enterprise of 
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imitation of nature before moving to its own production. This is the second stage, one that 
coincides with the Industrial Revolution: the imitation of nature is followed by the 
technological production. The simulacrum of the natural is overcome by the introduction 
of the replicable model, the seriality. The fake turns into industrial code and the centrality 
of the authentic and unique falls definitely, although it re-emerges as a fetishistic 
condition. The third stage is the simulation: medium after medium, the real accomplishes 
itself. The industrial code turns to the communication code. The art itself takes this 
principle of simulation that removes every other competitive principle, be it reality or 
pleasure. In this radical perspective the question so often formulated by Danto around 
Warhol's Brillo Boxes – «Given two objects that look exactly alike, how it is possible for 
one of them to be a work of art and the other one just an ordinary object?» (Danto [2009]: 
62) – seems almost an untimely academic exercise. So modernity has produced in its 
course three types of simulacra: a) the natural or mimetic simulacrum based on image and 
counterfeiting that is the simulacrum condemned by Plato; b) the industrial simulacrum 
that is the expression of the technologisation of reality simulacrum, finding in Benjamin 
and McLuhan its decisive interpreters; and c) the simulacrum of simulation that defines 
the contemporary hyperreality. Where there was reality there is now simulation; where 
there were objects constituting reality, now there are simulacra. 
The latent Platonism of Baudrillard emerges clearly with a further classification of the 
image, this time in four parts. To the three Platonic dimensions of falsification (eikon, 
eidolon, phantasma) Baudrillard responds with an increasing absence of image 
references with respect to the real, with the path from representation leading to 
simulation: image «is the reflection of a profound reality; it marks and denatures a 
profound reality; it masks the absence of a profound reality; it has no relation to any 
reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum» (Baudrillard [1981]: 6).  
The paradigmatic expression of this historical condition is Disneyland which Baudrillard, 
like Eco, does not hesitate to define as the exemplary model of all simulacra. Beyond every 
pleasure principle (the ideology of amusement and cultural industry embodied by 
Disneyland), beyond every reality principle (the evolution of postmodern cities from Los 
Angeles to Disneyland via Las Vegas), Disneyland exhibits the final dimension where the 
aesthetics of fake overturn every Platonic principle in a specular way (and so it reveals 
itself as deeply Platonic). Disneyland exhibits hyperreality to its most primordial degree; it 
is the step that will activate – just to give two examples – the sinister dystopias of a reality 
simulated by machines and their dictatorship (Matrix), and a further variant of the myth of 
the cave, the world as a reality show (The Truman Show). «It is no longer a question of a 
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false representation of reality (ideology) but of concealing the fact that the real is no 
longer, and thus of saving the reality principle. The imaginary of Disneyland is neither true 
nor false, it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate the fiction of the real in 
the opposite camp» (Baudrillard [1981]: 12-13). 
3.The operative fake 
Disneyland is, however, at the same time, the end and the beginning of a path: it marks 
a border between reality and hyperreality. It records the historical moment when the 
fake, as suggested by Eco, becomes an absolute fake and in this process its 
confrontation with the authentic loses all its meaning. In postmodern hyperreality the 
fake is realised as an operational dimension, a concrete dimension of the everyday. So 
we do not have to consider Disneyland (nobody lives at Disneyland), but those cities 
where the fake is still in conflict with the idea of an original model. If we admit that 
contemporaneity has experienced three great processes of aestheticism – pop (from the 
mid-1950s to early 1970s), postmodernism (from the 1970s to the late 1980s), and 
diffuse aesthetics (1990s to present) – then you will need to focus on the later stage in 
which the most varied practices fall into an immense strategy of falsification and 
hybridisation: kitsch, aesthetics of fake, cult of quotations, cult of appearance, and 
fiction. If Los Angeles is the city that still belongs to a definite pop culture (Banham 
[1971]) and Disneyland to a third phase of early hyperreality, Las Vegas exhibits that 
central moment when the hyperreal did not yet emancipate itself from the logic of 
falsification: it has not yet arrived at the absolute. 
The Austrian architect Hans Hollein proposed a first analysis of architectural fiction, 
where the image (the simulated simulacrum) is more central than the reality that may 
be experienced (the building): «A building can become entirely information – its 
message might be experienced through informational media (press, TV, etc.). in fact it is 
almost no importance whether, for example, the Acropolis or the Pyramids exist in 
physical reality, as most people are aware of them through other media anyway and not 
through an experience of their own. Indeed, their importance – the role they play – is 
based on this effect of information. Thus a building might be simulated only» (Hollein 
[1968]: 462). Recovering Benjamin's reflections discussed in The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction, Hollein focuses on the aesthetic experience of the role of 
the image in the media universe, no longer a substitute for the original, but the unique 
usable dimension: the exhibition value is the new real. 
It is in the way this exhibition’s value is narrated that postmodernity sharpens its 
Andrea Mecacci, Aesthetics of Fake 
pag. 67 
© Aisthesis – pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico • 2/2016 • www.fupress.com/aisthesis • ISSN 2035-8466 
mimetic strategies. The processes of falsification are poured out in a cultural 
hermeneutics which is translated into a «replication of the permanent past» (McHale 
[1969]: 104), like the Parthenon in Nashville had already anticipated. However, the 
replication logic still admitted a relationship with the past model, whereas in 
postmodernism, all that declines as shown by the toponymy of some American cities 
that do not even require the adjective new to recognise their identity. If in fact the 
addition of new was changed to old, by reactivating the hierarchy of the European 
model and the American copy (Orleans and New Orleans), now this dynamic would be 
removed. The copy is the archetype of the self: Naples (Florida), Rome (Georgia), Venice 
(Florida or a neighborhood of Los Angeles), Palermo (California), Milan (Michigan). 
Another example, in which the postmodern already appears as hyperreal, is the case of 
the Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas. Here you can see in action the operative fake in the 
falsifying overlapping of signified and signifier when a dimension of the past, ancient 
Egypt, is replicated. The signifier (the word «Luxor») does not indicate the reproduction 
of the Luxor Temple but has another meaning, the sphinx and the Khafre pyramid at 
Giza, although the size of the hotel refers not to the Khafre pyramid, the second largest 
after that of Cheops, but to the pyramid of Menkaure, the third and smallest at the site. 
The operative fake, the «semantic eclecticism» (Jencks [2011]: 56), is still an exercise 
of accumulation of cultural referents, a conscious exercise of quotations, and is the last 
stage before the hyperreal. If today Piazza d’Italia (1976-1979) by Charles Moore in New 
Orleans has become a symbol of postmodern architecture, at the same time it is also an 
implicit model (more or less conscious) of every Italian outlet store. The revival of the 
old as a solution to contemporary needs can also take the form of the ironic provocation 
that the fake often brings deliberately with itself, as evidence, one of the most mocking 
moments of the postmodern Bible scoffers, Learning Las Vegas, where the styles 
(hypothetical or real?) of the Nevada city are listed: «Miami Moroccan, International Jet 
Set Style; Arte Moderne Hollywood Orgasmic, Organic Behind; Yamasaki Bernini cum 
Roman Orgiastic; Niemeyer Moorish; Moorish Tudor (Arabian Knights); Bauhaus 
Hawaian» (Venturi, Scott Brown, Izenour [1977]: 80). 
The history of Las Vegas, in the years that separate it from the year of the first 
publication of Learning from Las Vegas (1972), shows the passage from a city modulated 
according to an iconographic logic (the signs on the Strip) to a city identified with its own 
scene-design strength (as documented by the Luxor Hotel). This dramatisation of urban 
space, its hyperreal Disneylandisation, leads to the extreme logic that postmodernism 
had developed in its relationship with modernist aesthetics – a game of mirrors that 
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seemed to repeat what had established Platonic mimesis, the conflict between true and 
false. The German historian of architecture Heinrich Klotz at the conclusion of his The 
History of Postmodern Architecture has identified ten oppositions between the modern 
and the postmodern (Klotz [1984]: 421) and one might add that just in the space 
opening from this dialectic that fake finds its operativity. The ten characteristics 
proposed by Klotz revolve around a basic bipolarity: the postmodern has placed at its 
centre a fictional representation marginalising the totem of modernist planning, the 
function. In other words, it replaced the function of truth, the realisation itself of techne, 
with the tale of illusion, the extemporaneous work of the imagination. It dismissed the 
primacy of technological utopianism and replaced it with a multiplicity of meanings. This 
grammar resumes wholly the vocabulary of fake (fiction, illusion, allusion) and 
transforms the fiction (the fake) into the new function (the truth), a perfect exchange of 
values that leads directly to Disneyland. 
In conclusion, all that remains is to rely on three suggestions. It is possible to accept the 
fake as a viable and unproblematic aesthetics – and indeed it is so – but it is not possible 
to ignore the sinister presage of a humanity that resolves in a replication of itself, has its 
own image in its specular simulacrum, the «more human than human», the motto of 
Tyrell Corporation, the company that produces replicants in Blade Runner. It is not 
possible either to pretend to have forgotten a premonitory piece of Burgess’s A Clockwork 
Orange, reported by Kubrick’s film version without failure: «It’s funny how the colors of 
the real world only seem really real when you viddy them on the screen» (Burgess [1962]: 
115). The last suggestion, less depressive and more conciliatory, is a phrase of Morris 
Lapidus, the architect precursor of postmodernism to whom we owe, among others, the 
Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami, where the initial scene of the film Goldfinger was filmed. 
The sentence, expressed by Lapidus in “Progressive Architecture” in September 1970, 
could be cited in Learning from Las Vegas (Venturi, Scott Brown, Izenour [1977]: 80): 
«People are looking for illusions; they don’t want the world’s realities. And, I asked, where 
do I find this world of illusions? Where are their tastes formulated? Do they study it in 
school? Do they go to the museums? Do they travel in Europe? Only place – the movies. 
They go to the movies. The hell with everything else». Today, it would be enough to 
replace only the monitor type in this sentence and the result would not change. 
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